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51 
Note 
KOKESH v. SEC: THE SUPREME COURT REDEFINES AN 
EFFECTIVE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT TOOL 
CONOR DALY 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) 
possesses expansive powers to enforce the securities laws of the United 
States.1  Among those powers is the SEC’s ability to disgorge the wrongful 
profits of those who violate federal securities laws.2  Despite the Commis-
sion’s broad powers, the general statute of limitations, Section 2462,3 re-
stricts the time frame in which the SEC can seek certain civil remedies for 
misconduct.4  In Kokesh v. SEC,5 the Supreme Court of the United States 
determined whether the five-year statute of limitations for enforcement pro-
ceedings applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement of a defendant’s ill-
gotten profits.6  The Supreme Court held that disgorgement “operat[ed] as a 
penalty” under the statute of limitations, and therefore, the SEC must com-
mence an enforcement action within five years of the date of the wrongdo-
ing in order to successfully seek disgorgement.7 
The Court reached the correct decision in this case because the SEC 
used the disgorgement remedy to punish defendants for wrongs against the 
United States and to deter others from committing the same violations.8  
Further, the Supreme Court correctly found that the SEC did not utilize the 
civil remedy to compensate victims for their losses or merely return defend-
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 1.  SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 2.  See id. at 201 (describing disgorgement as belonging within the “catalogue of permissible 
equitable remedies” available to the SEC). 
 3.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 4.  Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 449, 451–52, 454 (2013) (holding that the discovery rule 
does not apply to § 2462 when the SEC seeks civil penalties against defendants over five years 
after the alleged securities fraud occurred). 
 5.  137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 6.  Id. at 1640–41. 
 7.  Id. at 1645. 
 8.  See infra Part II.A. 
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ants to where they were before their misconduct.9  The Court’s decision, 
however, will likely burden the SEC’s enforcement capabilities because the 
Commission now has less settlement leverage for violations over five years 
old.10  Further, while this decision will likely restrain the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement, it may also lead to substantially larger costs for defendants 
that are ordered to disgorge their illegal profits, since civil penalties are 
likely not covered by insurance policies or deductible under the Internal 
Revenue Code.11 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Section I.A of this Part discusses the formation and responsibilities of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as the Commission’s 
power to enforce federal securities laws.  Section I.B discusses the purpose 
and application of the statute of limitations for enforcing civil penalties12 
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “penalty” under other federal 
laws in prior cases.  Section I.C describes the procedural background of 
Kokesh v. SEC.  Section I.D summarizes the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in holding that Section 2462 applies to disgorgement orders. 
A.  The Origins, Purpose, and Powers of the SEC 
After the stock market crash in 1929 and the resulting Great Depres-
sion, Congress passed a series of laws13 designed to prevent the abuses14 in 
the securities industry that contributed to the economic downfall of Ameri-
ca in the 1930s.15  Congress’s main intention for passing these new regula-
tory schemes was to “achieve a high standard of business ethics in the secu-
rities industry.”16  Specifically, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 “[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges” and “to 
                                                          
 9.  See infra Part II.B. 
 10.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 12.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (“[A]n action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any 
civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless com-
menced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 13.  Such legislation included the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012), the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C §§ 78a–78pp (2012), the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79 (repealed 2005), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77aaa–77bbbb(2012), the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-
64(2012), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012).  SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 14.  Though many actions were proscribed under these acts, examples of abuses which Con-
gress sought to prevent include investment advisers sharing in the profits of their clients or engag-
ing in activities that would impact an adviser’s ability to give impartial investment advice to their 
clients.  Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 189 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 477, at 67, 29 (1940)). 
 15.  Id. at 186. 
 16.  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933)). 
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prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges.”17  Under these 
laws, the SEC has broad authority to investigate potential violations of fed-
eral securities laws and issue subpoenas18 for evidence related to an investi-
gation.19 
Further, Congress provides the SEC with broad powers to enforce fed-
eral securities laws in court.20  Whenever the SEC determines that someone 
is in violation, the Commission can seek an injunction against such ac-
tions.21  The SEC can also bring an action for civil money penalties22 in 
federal court against alleged violators.23  Under this statutory scheme and 
the broad equitable powers of the federal courts, the SEC can bring a varie-
ty of injunctive and ancillary remedies to enforce federal securities laws.24 
Beside injunctions, a form of ancillary or non-injunctive relief the SEC 
can seek in federal district courts is the disgorgement of illegally obtained 
profits.25  Federal courts describe disgorgement as “a method of forcing a 
defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.”26  
Upon a showing of federal securities law violations, a federal court may or-
der the disgorgement of a reasonable estimation of the defendant’s illegally 
obtained profits.27  The court must separate the defendant’s illegally and le-
gally obtained profits when calculating the disgorgement amount,28 and 
“because of the difficulty of determining with certainty the extent to which 
a defendant’s gains resulted from his frauds—especially profits from trans-
actions in securities whose market price has been affected by the frauds—
                                                          
 17.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)). 
 18.  Those who receive a subpoena from the SEC are not subject to penalties for refusing to 
obey, but the Commission may enforce compliance with the investigation in federal court.  SEC v. 
Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(b), 78u(c) (2012)). 
 19.  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b), 78u(a), (b) (2012)). 
 20.  SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 21.  15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person 
is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a viola-
tion of the [securities laws] . . . the Commission may, in its discretion, bring an action in any dis-
trict court of the United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing, a 
permanent or temporary injunction . . . .”). 
 22.  A civil money penalty is used to punish a defendant “for violating a public law” and goes 
farther than just compensating the victim for their loss.  SEC v. Kokesh, No. 09-cv-1021, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *21 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2015) (quoting United States v. Telluride Co., 
146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 23.  15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(1) (2012). 
 24.  Materia, 745 F.2d at 200–01. 
 25.  Id. at 201. 
 26.  SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth 
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 27.  Id. (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 28.  Id. (quoting CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 788 F.2d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 
1986)). 
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the court need not determine the amount of such gains with exactitude.”29  
The SEC has sought disgorgement for a variety of securities law violations, 
such as pump-and-dump schemes,30 Ponzi schemes,31 and misappropria-
tions of funds from investors.32  While federal courts view disgorgement as 
part of their equitable powers,33 Congress has only given the SEC express 
statutory authority to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings.34  
Federal courts, however, have authorized the SEC to seek any form of an-
cillary relief, including disgorgement, “where necessary and proper to ef-
fectuate the purposes of [a] statutory scheme.”35 
B.  The Statute of Limitations and the Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
of “Penalty” 
Under the statute of limitations, any “action, suit or proceeding for the 
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, 
shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date 
when the claim first accrued.”36  While applicable to securities law en-
forcement, this statute is broad in scope and applies to a variety of penalty 
provisions37 in the United States Code.38  This statute is considered a 
“catch-all statute of limitations in situations where Congress did not specif-
ically include a time limitation in [a] statute.”39  Under the statute, “a claim 
                                                          
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See, e.g., SEC v. World Info. Tech., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 574–75, 577–78 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (ordering the disgorgement of profits gained through a “pump-and-dump” scheme to create 
artificial demand in stock before sale at an inflated price). 
 31.  See, e.g., SEC v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 506, 521–24 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(ordering the disgorgement of assets arising out of a Ponzi scheme from a stock account jointly 
owned by an investment adviser and his wife). 
 32.  See, e.g., SEC v. Loomis, 17 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1030–32 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (ordering the 
disgorgement of both the funds which the owner of an investment planning company received for 
the purchase of unregistered securities and the interest avoided when he used those funds to take 
out loans). 
 33.  See SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 34.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(e) (2012) (“In any proceeding in which the Commission or the 
appropriate regulatory agency may impose a penalty under this section, the Commission or the 
appropriate regulatory agency may enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement, includ-
ing reasonable interest.”). 
 35.  SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 36.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 37.  Other enforcement actions this statute applies to include those under the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012), New Jersey v. RRI Energy Mid-Atlantic Power Holdings, LLC, 
960 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2013), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C 
§§ 41–58 (2012), United States v. Ancorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 516 F.2d 198, 200 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 38.  Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 454 (2013) (holding that civil penalty actions brought by 
the SEC must be brought within five years of the date the wrongdoing occurred under § 2462). 
 39.  FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1995). 
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accrues ‘when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action’”40 
and not when the plaintiff has “discovered” the cause of action.41  Under 
this statute, potential defendants are only subject to penalty enforcement ac-
tions for an exact number of years, instead of an indeterminate amount of 
years.42  Potential defendants, therefore, may cease to fear defending against 
a penalty action five years after their wrongdoing, regardless of what the 
government knows at that point in time.43  The start of the statute of limita-
tions may be delayed until the wrong is discovered for some plaintiffs,44 but 
this exception has never been extended to the government bringing en-
forcement actions.45  Therefore, with few exceptions,46 government agen-
cies such as the SEC, whose purpose is to discover securities fraud and 
which possesses the tools to do so,47 must bring a civil enforcement action 
within five years of date of the wrongdoing.48 
Under the statute of limitations, the government must bring an en-
forcement action for penalties “within five years from the date when the 
claim first accrued.”49  Section 2462, however, does not provide a definition 
of “penalty” in its text.50  The Supreme Court has stepped in to define pen-
alty in several of its past cases.  In Huntington v. Attrill,51 the Court defined 
a penalty as an action that “denote[s] punishment, whether corporal or pe-
cuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offense against 
                                                          
 40.  Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 448 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). 
 41.  Id. at 449 (quoting Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644 (2010)). 
 42.  See id. at 452 (“Yet grafting the discovery rule onto § 2462 would raise similar concerns.  
It would leave defendants exposed to Government enforcement action not only for five years after 
their misdeeds, but for an additional uncertain period into the future.”). 
 43.  Id. (citing Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 (2000)). 
 44.  This principle is called the “discovery rule.”  Id. at 449.  The discovery rule is used to 
allow defrauded “victims who do not know they are injured and who reasonably do not inquire as 
to any injury” to delay the running of the statute of limitations until they discover the injury.  Id. at 
450–51.  This rule applies to private parties unaware of their injuries and not government en-
forcement authorities.  See id. (explaining the “good reasons why the fraud discovery rule has not 
been extended to Government enforcement actions for civil penalties” but has been extended to 
private parties). 
 45.  Id. at 449. 
 46.  Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, a plaintiff may, 
toll the statute [of limitations] if the plaintiff alleges: (1) that the defendants concealed 
the cause of action; (2) that the plaintiff did not discover the cause of action until some 
point within five years of commencing the action; and (3) that the plaintiff’s continuing 
ignorance was not attributable to lack of diligence on its part. 
SEC v. Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d 415, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing SEC v. Jones, No. 05 Civ. 7044 
(RCC), 2006 WL 1084276, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006)). 
 47.  Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 451. 
 48.  Id. at 454. 
 49.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
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its laws”52 and described the term as “elastic in meaning.”53  The Court 
found that a remedy that was brought for the purpose of punishing and de-
terring others from committing the same act constituted a penalty,54 while a 
remedy that merely gives compensatory damages to an injured party was 
not a penalty.55  Based on these definitions, the Court held that the test to 
determine whether a remedy qualified as a penalty was “whether the wrong 
sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public,” and therefore penal, “or a 
wrong to the individual,” and therefore nonpunitive.56 
A few years after the Huntington decision, the Court applied the test 
from that case to a copyright infringement statute57 in Brady v. Daly.58  In 
the case, Daly sued Brady for copyright infringement in federal circuit court 
and sought damages for the infringement under Section 4966 of the Revised 
Statutes.59  Brady asserted that the damages60 sought by Daly under Section 
4966 constituted a penalty, which federal district courts had exclusive juris-
diction over and, therefore, that the circuit court61 that heard the case had no 
jurisdiction over it.62  The Court noted that the statute did not mention the 
word penalty or forfeiture and only provided for damages that directly re-
sulted from the copyright infringement.63  The Court further noted, “The 
“whole recovery [was] given to the proprietor, and the statute d[id] not pro-
vide for a recovery by any other person in case the proprietor himself ne-
glects to sue.”64  Therefore, because the statute gave only the victim of cop-
yright infringement, and not the public, a right to damages, the Court found 
that the recovery awarded was not a penalty.65 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 667 (citing United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402 (1888); and then citing 
United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880)). 
 53.  Id.  The Court noted the term’s elastic meaning allows it “even to be familiarly applied to 
cases of private contracts, wholly independent of statutes.”  Id.  
 54.  Id. at 668 (quoting Reed v. Inhabitants of Northfield, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 94, 100–01 
(1832)). 
 55.  Id. at 667–68 (quoting Read v. Inhabitants of Chelmsford, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 128, 132 
(1834)). 
 56.  Id. at 668. 
 57.  REV. STAT. § 4966 (1875). 
 58.  175 U.S. 148, 155–57 (1899) (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667). 
 59.  Id. at 150–51. 
 60.  Under the statute, those who infringe on a copyright “shall be liable for damages . . . not 
less than one hundred dollars for the first, and fifty dollars for every subsequent performance.”  
§ 4966. 
 61.  Federal circuit courts at the time had jurisdiction over “all suits at law or in equity arising 
under the patent or copyright laws of the United States.”  Daly, 175 U.S. at 153 (quoting REV. 
STAT. § 629(9) (1875)). 
 62.  Id. at 152. 
 63.  Id. at 154 (“The person wrongfully performing or representing a dramatic composition is, 
in the words of the statute, ‘liable for damages therefor[e].’  This means all the damages, that are 
the direct result of his wrongful act.”). 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 156. 
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The Supreme Court later applied the Huntington test to a statute of 
limitations66 similar67 to Section 2462 in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R.68  In 
district court, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company was ordered to pay damag-
es for illegal rates it charged to Meeker’s coal trading firm.69  Lehigh Val-
ley, however, argued that the then-current statute of limitations barred 
Meeker’s claims.70  Comparable to Section 2462, the disputed statute of 
limitations “place[d] a limitation of five years upon any ‘suit or prosecution 
for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the 
laws of the United States.’”71  The Court found that “penalty” in the statute 
referred to remedies imposed for punitive reasons and not for redressing 
private injuries, so the statute of limitations did not apply to the reparation 
damages awarded to Meeker, even though Lehigh Valley’s actions violated 
public law.72  Recent Supreme Court cases have echoed the sentiments of 
Huntington, Brady, and Meeker and found that penalties are remedies that 
typically “go beyond compensation”73 and “intend[] to punish culpable in-
dividuals.”74 
Prior to Kokesh, several United States courts of appeals considered 
whether Section 2462 applied to disgorgement.75  Along with the Tenth 
Circuit,76 the majority of circuit courts held that the remedy was an equita-
ble remedy and not a penalty, including the D.C.,77 First,78 and Ninth79 Cir-
                                                          
 66.  REV. STAT. § 1047 (1914). 
 67.  This statute of limitations has been called the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 2462.  Johnson 
v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 68.  236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915). 
 69.  Id. at 422. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 423 (quoting REV. STAT. § 1047 (1914)). 
 72.  Id.  The Court found that “the liability sought to be enforced [against Lehigh Valley] was 
not punitive but strictly remedial.”  Id. (quoting REV. STAT. § 1047 (1914)). 
 73.  Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 451–52 (2013) (“[P]enalties, which go beyond compensa-
tion, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers.” (citing Meeker, 236 U.S. at 423)). 
 74.  Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (“A civil penalty was a type of remedy at 
common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.  Remedies intended to punish culpable 
individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, 
were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (considering whether the 
SEC’s “order requiring [defendants] to disgorge all profits (plus prejudgment interest) from their 
illegal transactions impose[d] a civil penalty”); SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 148 (1st Cir. 
2008) (determining whether § 2462 applies to “disgorgement of ill-gotten gains”); SEC v. Gra-
ham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016) (considering whether “§ 2462’s statute of limitations 
applies to disgorgement”). 
 76.  See United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
disgorgement was not a penalty under the statute of limitations because of its remedial nature); see 
infra text accompanying notes 117–118. 
 77.  See Zacharias, 569 F.3d at 471 (holding the disgorgement of the defendants’ illegal prof-
its was not a civil penalty subject to § 2462). 
 78.  See Tambone, 550 F.3d at 148 (holding that § 2462 only applied to “penalties sought by 
the SEC” and not disgorgement or injunctions). 
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cuits.  In fact, the only court of appeals that held the statute of limitations 
applied to disgorgement was the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Graham.80  
However, the Eleventh Circuit found that disgorgement was functionally 
synonymous with “forfeiture,” another remedy subject to Section 2462.81  
Therefore, while this holding created a circuit split regarding the applicabil-
ity of Section 2462 to disgorgement,82 no court of appeals held that dis-
gorgement was a penalty under the statute of limitations before the Supreme 
Court decided Kokesh.83 
C.  Lower Court Decisions in Kokesh v. SEC 
Charles Kokesh owned and operated two investment adviser firms 
(“Advisers”), which gave investment advice to several business develop-
ment companies84 (“Funds”).85  Each of the Advisers had compensation 
contracts with the Funds signed by Mr. Kokesh, which prohibited payments 
to the Advisers not enumerated in the agreements.86  On October 27, 2009, 
the SEC filed a complaint against Mr. Kokesh, alleging that from 1995 to 
2007, he misappropriated nearly $35 million from the Funds; filed “false 
and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements” to hide the misappropri-
ations; and executed contracts with “illegal performance-fee provisions.”87  
After a five-day trial during early November 2014, the jury found against 
Mr. Kokesh on all claims.88 
The jury found that Mr. Kokesh directed the Advisers’ treasurer to 
withdraw $23.8 million from the Funds to compensate the Advisers’ em-
ployees and $5 million to pay for rent.89  Mr. Kokesh also directed his firms 
to take $6.1 million from the Funds that were described as “tax distribu-
                                                          
 79.  See SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ctions for disgorgement of 
improper profits are equitable in nature.”). 
 80.  823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 81.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that because it held that disgorgement was considered 
forfeiture under § 2462, the court did not need to “reach the defendants’ alternative argument that” 
the remedy was a penalty.  Id. at 1363 n.3. 
 82.  Compare Zacharias, 569 F.3d at 471 (holding the disgorgement of the defendants’ illegal 
profits was not a civil penalty subject to § 2462), with Graham, 823 F.3d at 1363 (finding no sig-
nificant difference between forfeiture and disgorgement and, therefore, disgorgement is subject to 
§ 2462). 
 83.  137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 84.  These companies “raised money from investors through public securities offerings and 
invested in private start-up companies that focused on technology, biotechnology, and medical 
diagnostics.”  SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 
(2017). 
 85.  SEC v. Kokesh, No. 09-cv-1021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *1–2 (D.N.M Mar. 
30, 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 86.  Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1161.  
 87.  Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *2. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1161. 
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tions”90 in the SEC reports he signed, although he only paid approximately 
$10,000 in federal taxes that year.91  All of these payments were either not 
explicitly permitted under the contract or expressly prohibited by the con-
tracts’ language and, therefore, in violation of the agreements.92  Though 
the agreements were amended at one point to allow for reimbursement for 
controlling-person salaries, Mr. Kokesh misrepresented himself as the only 
controlling-person and reported a much smaller salary than he had re-
ceived93 in a proxy statement.94  Mr. Kokesh was found in “direct violation” 
of Section 37 of the Investment Company Act of 194095 for “‘knowingly 
and willfully’ convert[ing] investment-company assets to his own use or to 
the use of another”96 and was also found to have aided and abetted viola-
tions of several federal securities laws97 for “‘knowingly and substantially 
assisting” the Advisers” to engage in securities fraud.98 
After the rendering of the verdict, the SEC sought entry of final judg-
ment ordering Mr. Kokesh “(1) to pay a civil money penalty, (2) to be per-
manently enjoined from violating . . . federal securities laws, and (3) to dis-
gorge” money misappropriated during the various violations.99  However, 
because some of the claims brought by the SEC accrued outside of the five-
year statute of limitations period,100 the district court could not order civil 
money penalties101 for those specific claims.102  Under the statute, “any civil 
fine, penalty, or forfeiture” cannot be ordered five years after a civil action 
is brought.103  The district court, however, found that neither an injunction 
                                                          
 90.  Mr. Kokesh received ninety percent of these distributions.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Mr. Kokesh reported an average salary of $221,000 from 1998 to 2000, while the accu-
rate figure was $771,000.  SEC v. Kokesh, No. 09-cv-1021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *3 
(D.N.M Mar. 30, 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 94.  Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1161. 
 95.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (2012). 
 96.  Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *2. 
 97.  The provisions included § 205 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2012); §§ 206(1) 
and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1)–(2) (2012); §§ 13(a) and 14(a) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (2012); Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, and 14a-
9, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 14a-9 (2017); § 209(f) of the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(f) (2012); and § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).  Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *5. 
 98.  Id. at *4–5. 
 99.  Id. at *6. 
 100.  Claims against Mr. Kokesh that accrued on or before October 26, 2004 were not subject 
to civil penalties.  Id. at *8. 
 101.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *7–8. 
 103.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, 
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or other-
wise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim 
first accrued . . . .”). 
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nor disgorgement serve as a penalty and were, therefore, not subject to the 
statute of limitations.104  The district court found that an injunction was not 
a penalty “because it does not seek compensation unrelated to or in excess 
of the damage caused by Defendant . . . [and] is precisely tailored to De-
fendant’s wrongs.”105  The district court further reasoned that disgorgement 
was not a penalty either because ordering Mr. Kokesh to hand over his prof-
its that resulted from his wrongful actions was “quintessentially equita-
ble.”106  Therefore, the District Court ordered an injunction107 and dis-
gorgement of $34,927,329 against Mr. Kokesh, along with a civil penalty of 
$2,354,593108 for claims accrued within the limitations period.109  Mr. 
Kokesh appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit on the grounds that the injunction and disgorgement orders were pro-
hibited under the statute of limitations.110 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s injunction and disgorge-
ment orders.111  The court first considered whether an injunction is a penal-
ty.112  Noting “everyone has a duty to obey the law,” the Tenth Circuit 
found no reason to deem an injunction as a penalty.113  The purpose of the 
injunction was to protect the public from further violations by incentiviz-
ing114 Mr. Kokesh not to break any more laws.115  The Tenth Circuit then 
considered whether disgorgement was a penalty or forfeiture under Section 
2462.116  In United States v. Telluride Co.,117 the Tenth Circuit already held 
that disgorgement was not a penalty under the statute of limitations because 
of its remedial nature.118  The Tenth Circuit found that the purpose of dis-
gorgement was not to inflict punishment on the defendant but to eliminate 
profits reaped from the illegal activities.119  The court noted that the remedy 
only “leaves the wrongdoer ‘in the position he would have occupied had 
                                                          
 104.  Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *32. 
 105.  Id. at *21–22 (citing United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 
1998)). 
 106.  Id. at *29–30. 
 107.  Mr. Kokesh was enjoined from committing any future violations of securities laws.  Id. at 
*7. 
 108.  The district court set the appropriate amount of the civil money penalty as the amount of 
funds Mr. Kokesh received during the limitations period.  Id. at *15. 
 109.  Id. at *31–32. 
 110.  SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 111.  Id. at 1160. 
 112.  Id. at 1162. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  If Mr. Kokesh violated the injunction, he would be held in contempt of court.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 1164. 
 117.  146 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 118.  Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1164 (citing Telluride, 146 F.3d at 1247). 
 119.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
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there been no misconduct.’”120  Therefore, while the Tenth Circuit ordered 
Mr. Kokesh to disgorge more than just the funds that he kept,121 the court 
found that it was not a penalty to order a wrongdoer to pay back all of the 
funds misappropriated by him, regardless of who received the money.122  
While disgorgement-style remedies were recently added to some federal 
forfeiture statutes,123 the Tenth Circuit noted that such expansion in gov-
ernment power began decades after Section 2462 was passed.124  Conse-
quently, because courts interpret statutory language as Congress would 
have understood it at the time of passage,125 the Tenth Circuit found that 
disgorgement was not a type of “forfeiture” under Section 2462.126  Mr. 
Kokesh appealed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States then granted certiorari to hear the case.127 
D.  The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Kokesh v. SEC 
In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the 
Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that disgorgement was not a penalty under 28 
U.S.C. § 2462.128  The Court unanimously held that disgorgement for secu-
rities enforcement was a penalty under the statute of limitations and, there-
fore, must be brought within five years of the date that the claim ripened.129  
The Court defined a penalty as “a punishment, whether corporal or pecuni-
ary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its 
laws,”130 which evoked two principles used to construe the meaning of pen-
alty.131  First, the Court analyzed “whether the wrong sought to be redressed 
is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.”132  Second, the Court 
examined whether the remedy “is sought ‘for the purpose of punishment, 
and to deter others from offending in like manner’—as opposed to compen-
sating a victim for his loss.”133  In applying these principles, the Court 
found that disgorgement is a penalty for three reasons: (1) disgorgement 
                                                          
 120.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
 121.  Some of the money Mr. Kokesh misappropriated went to other people.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 1164–65 (citing SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 307 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
 123.  Id. at 1166 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2012)).  The statute of limitations applies to 
civil forfeitures.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
 124.  Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1166.  The statute of limitations was codified in 1948.  Id. 
 125.  Id. (quoting Hackwell v. United States, 491 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1641 (2017). 
 128.  Id. at 1645. 
 129.  Id. at 1639, 1645. 
 130.  Id. at 1642 (alteration in original) (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 
(1892)). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668). 
 133.  Id. (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668). 
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serves as a repercussion for violating public laws;134 (2) it is used punitively 
to deter violations of public laws;135 and (3) the remedy does not serve a 
compensatory purpose.136 
The Court began by examining the history and purpose of the Com-
mission.137  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created an agency with 
the power “to prescribe ‘rules and regulations . . . as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors’”138 and the power 
to investigate potential violations of securities laws.139  The agency is able 
to bring enforcement claims in federal court if evidence of a securities vio-
lation is discovered.140  Though at first the only remedy the SEC could 
bring was an injunction,141 courts began to order disgorgements in the 
1970s “to ‘deprive . . . defendants of their profits in order to remove any 
monetary reward for violating’ securities laws and to ‘protect the investing 
public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.’”142  Con-
gress further permitted the SEC to seek monetary civil penalties143 in the 
1990s.144  With a variety of effective tools and remedies available to enforce 
federal securities laws, the Court noted that the SEC still pursues disgorge-
ment in its enforcement actions.145 
The Court then used two principles to interpret the term “penalty” in 
the context of the statute of limitations.146  The first principle analyzed 
whether the sanction is used to remedy a wrong to a person or to the pub-
lic.147  The second principle considered whether the remedy is used to deter 
future violations and punishment or to recompense a victim for their loss.148  
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 1643. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 1644. 
 137.  Id. at 1639–40. 
 138.  Id. at 1640 (alteration in original) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 728 (1975)). 
 139.  Id. (quoting SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984)). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. (citing 1 T. HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:37 (7th ed., rev. 2016)). 
 142.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 143.  The law permits the Commission to impose a civil penalty to be paid by the defendant, 
and the size of the penalty is determined by the egregiousness of the wrongful act.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 77t(d) (2012). 
 144.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1640.  This remedy was authorized as part of the Securities En-
forcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act.  Id. (citing Securities Enforcement and Penny 
Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 932 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) 
(2012))). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1642. 
 147.  Id. (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)); see supra text accompany-
ing note 132. 
 148.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667); see supra text accom-
panying note 133. 
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The Court previously used these principles to construe the meaning of pen-
alty for other statutes of limitations149 and the statutory predecessor150 of 
Section 2462.151  The Court held that a remedy that provides compensation 
for a private wrong is not a penalty,152 while a remedy that is “imposed in a 
punitive way for an infraction of a public law” is a penalty.153 
In applying these two principles to disgorgement, the Court held that 
the remedy is a penalty under the statute of limitations.154  First, the Court 
argued that disgorgement sought by the SEC was ordered for a violation of 
a public law.155  When such a remedy is sought, the Court noted it was or-
dered for a violation committed against the United States and may ensue 
regardless of the victim’s support of or participation in the civil action.156  
Second, the remedy is used for punitive purposes.157  Since the SEC began 
to seek disgorgement “courts have consistently held that ‘[t]he primary pur-
pose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by 
depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.’”158  The Court observed that 
civil remedies used to deter violations of the law are intrinsically puni-
tive.159  Third, the Court found the disgorgement brought by the SEC was 
often not compensatory.160  When the remedy is ordered, the ill-gotten gains 
are paid to the district court, and it is up to that court to decide how the 
money will be allocated.161  Though the disgorged profits may go to the vic-
tims of the violation, the courts are not obligated by statute to give any of 
the money to them.162 
In response to the SEC’s claim that disgorgement was not punitive and 
merely returned the defendant to the place he was in prior to the violation, 
the Court noted that the remedy sometimes left the defendant worse off than 
before.163  For example, someone who engaged in insider trading may have 
to pay back both their own profits and the gains of third parties that benefit-
                                                          
 149.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 153–54 (1899)). 
 150.  REV. STAT. § 1047 (1913); see supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 151.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (citing Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 421–22 
(1915)). 
 152.  Id. (citing Daly, 175 U.S. at 154). 
 153.  Id. at 1643 (quoting Meeker, 236 U.S. at 423). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
 159.  Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)). 
 160.  Id. at 1644. 
 161.  Id. (quoting Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 175). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 1644–45. 
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ted from their wrongful conduct.164  In this case, Mr. Kokesh’s business ex-
penses that reduced his overall profit were not considered when calculating 
the disgorgement.165  The Court noted that, although disgorgement could 
serve a compensatory goal, a civil remedy that also served a retributive or 
deterrent purpose was punishment.166  Accordingly, the Court concluded 
that disgorgement serves as a penalty under the statute of limitations and 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.167 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
disgorgement in securities enforcement operates as a penalty under the stat-
ute of limitations and must be brought within five years of the date the 
claim accrued.168  This Part will first discuss that the Court made the correct 
judgment in this case because the SEC used disgorgement to punish de-
fendants and not to compensate victims.169  This Part will then highlight the 
significant implications of Kokesh’s holding for the Commission, which 
now has a limited time frame to seek disgorgement and, consequently, less 
settlement leverage.170  Finally, this Part will discuss the heightened costs 
potentially facing defendants subject to disgorgement since disgorged prof-
its likely will not be tax deductible or covered by most insurance policies.171 
A.  The Supreme Court Correctly Determined That the SEC Uses 
Disgorgement to Punish Defendants for the Violation of Federal 
Securities Laws 
In applying the first principle from Huntington v. Attrill to determine 
whether a civil remedy is a penalty, the Court rightfully found that the SEC 
uses disgorgement in enforcement actions to remedy a wrong to the pub-
lic.172  The first Huntington principle considers whether the remedy is uti-
lized to redress a wrong to an individual or a wrong to the public.173  When 
requesting disgorgement, the SEC seeks to remedy a wrong against the 
United States, and not an individual person, which is why the SEC may en-
force federal securities laws violations in court without the consent of the 
                                                          
 164.  Id. at 1644 (quoting SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 1645 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993)). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 1639. 
 169.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 170.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 171.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 172.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643. 
 173.  Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see supra text accompanying note 132. 
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victim of the wrongdoing.174  The Commission has long taken the position 
that its “primary function is to protect the public from fraudulent and other 
unlawful practices and not to obtain damages for injured individuals.”175  
The SEC continued to recognize this function in its brief for Kokesh.176 
Further, the SEC uses disgorgement to discourage others from com-
mitting federal securities laws violations.177  The Supreme Court has noted 
that remedies imposed for the purpose of deterring violations of laws are 
punitive.178  The Commission has long said that, even in cases where the 
Commission asked for disgorged profits to be paid to those harmed, it sole-
ly acted to deter others from committing securities violations.179  In fact, the 
SEC’s policy for enforcement proceedings is to target violations predomi-
nantly “based on the message that will be sent to the public and to the in-
dustry about the reach of its enforcement actions and the amount of investor 
harm.”180  In its role as a law enforcement agency, the SEC has stated that it 
seeks disgorgement because injunctions against future violations alone can-
not provide effective deterrence.181  Federal courts have also held that the 
primary purpose of the civil remedy is deterrence182 and that effective SEC 
deterrence is dependent on the disgorgement remedy.183  Therefore, the 
SEC uses disgorgement to vindicate the public interest while enforcing fed-
eral securities laws. 
                                                          
 174.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643. 
 175.  41 SEC ANN. REP. 97–98 (1975). 
 176.  Brief for Respondent at 22, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529) (“When 
the SEC seeks disgorgement, it acts in the public interest, to remedy harm to the public at large, 
rather than standing in the shoes of particular injured parties.”). 
 177.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643. 
 178.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)). 
 179.  See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) (“While in rare cases, as an adjunct to injunctive relief, the Commis-
sion has urged a court to deprive violators of their illegal gains by directing that these be paid to 
individuals who have been injured by their violations, even in such cases the Commission does not 
seek to make investors whole; it seeks merely to deter violators by making violations unprofita-
ble.”). 
 180.  James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 
737, 763 (2003). 
 181.  Dolgow, 43 F.R.D. at 483. 
 182.  See, e.g., SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The primary pur-
pose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of 
their ill-gotten gains.”); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The theory behind 
[disgorgement] is deterrence and not compensation.”). 
 183.  See SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The deter-
rent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators 
were not required to disgorge illicit profits.”); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 
1308 (2d Cir. 1971) (“It would severely defeat the purposes of the [Securities Exchange Act of 
1934] if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to retain the profits from his violation.”). 
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B.  Strictly Punitive—The Court Properly Held the SEC Does Not 
Utilize Disgorgement to Compensate Victims or Remedy a Wrong 
The Court correctly found that the SEC’s use of disgorgement in secu-
rities law enforcement does not compensate the victim for their loss or only 
extract the defendant’s ill-gotten gains when applying the second Hunting-
ton principle.184  The second Huntington principle determines whether the 
remedy is sought to compensate a victim for their losses or to punish the de-
fendant.185  The SEC argued in Kokesh that disgorgement orders are often 
compensatory and, therefore, “unambiguously nonpunitive.”186  However, 
federal courts have decided “[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement [was] 
not to refund others for losses suffered but rather ‘to deprive the wrongdoer 
of his ill-gotten gain.’”187  This is evinced by the fact that, if the SEC suc-
cessfully seeks a disgorgement order, the disgorged profits are paid to the 
federal district court and not directly to the aggrieved individual.188  Even 
though a district court may choose to give the disgorged funds to the victim 
of the violation, it has no legal obligation to do so.189  Funds have been dis-
tributed to other recipients, such as the United States Treasury.190  In fact, 
from 1998 to 2002, 35 out of 87 SEC enforcement actions that successfully 
sought disgorgement either distributed the funds to the U.S. Treasury or had 
made no payment at all.191  In fiscal year 2015, the SEC successfully ob-
tained over $4 billion from disgorgement and civil penalties, but only $158 
million was distributed to defrauded investors.192  In enforcement actions, 
the SEC focuses primarily on extracting profits from those who violated se-
curities laws and less on what happens to those funds.193  For example, from 
1987 to 1994, the agency collected data on the application of disgorgement 
                                                          
 184.  Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017). 
 185.  Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see supra text accompanying note 133. 
 186.  Brief for Respondent at 10, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529). 
 187.  SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 188.  See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Once the profits have 
been disgorged, it remains within the court’s discretion to determine how and to whom the money 
will be distributed . . . .”). 
 189.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644. 
 190.  Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 171. 
 191.  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 5, 10 (2003).  Thirty-eight of those actions paid defrauded 
investors either directly or through alternative methods and the remaining cases were expected to 
pay those harmed by the fraud, though no payments had been made yet.  Id. at 10–11. 
 192.  Jonathan N. Eisenberg, 13 Observations about the SEC’s Enforcement Program, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/18/13-observations-about-the-secs-enforcement-
program/.  This is the lowest amount of disgorged funds the SEC has distributed to investors since 
the Commission started disclosing this information in fiscal year 2012.  Id. 
 193.  Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 
BUS. LAW. 317, 321 (2008). 
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orders against defendants, but the agency kept no information on how much 
money was disgorged or where it was distributed.194 
Further, the Court correctly held that disgorgement often does not re-
turn the defendant back to the place they would have been if the violation 
had never occurred.195  The SEC argued that disgorgement was not a penal-
ty because it merely restored the status quo and lessened the harm done by 
the defendant’s wrongdoing.196  Disgorgement, however, can exceed the de-
fendant’s total profits gained from the securities law violation.197  For ex-
ample, a defendant that engaged in insider trading may have to disgorge 
both their own profits and the profits of third parties that resulted from the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.198  A defendant subject to disgorgement could be 
held jointly and severally liable for the profits of someone else that engaged 
in the same wrongdoing.199  In Mr. Kokesh’s case, the amount the SEC dis-
gorged did not consider his overall business expenses that reduced his over-
all profit.200  Further, the Commission and federal courts “generally say that 
disgorgement can be ordered even against defendants who no longer pos-
sess or have access to the tainted profits, or never possessed them at all.”201  
The SEC, however, does grant disgorgement waivers to defendants that 
cannot pay the disgorgement order, though both the SEC and a court must 
approve the waiver.202  Though disgorgement may serve a compensatory 
purpose, the Supreme Court has previously held that civil penalties can 
                                                          
 194.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-94-188, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN SEC CONTROLS OVER DISGORGEMENT CASES 3 (1994). 
 195.  Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017). 
 196.  Brief for Respondent at 17, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529) (quot-
ing SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 197.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644. 
 198.  See SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing tipper-tippee con-
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tion in original)). 
 202.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-771, SEC ENFORCEMENT: MORE ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF DISGORGEMENT COLLECTIONS 6, 25 (2002), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02771.pdf. 
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serve many purposes, and a civil action that does not serve a strictly reme-
dial purpose, but also a deterrent purpose, is punishment.203 
C.  Higher Stakes—The SEC’s New Time Crunch and Potential 
Increased Costs for Defendants 
While the Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Kokesh v. 
SEC, this case will likely have significant impact on both the SEC and de-
fendants in enforcement actions.  The agency will likely have less leverage 
in settlement negotiations and pursue older misconduct less aggressively or 
not at all.204  Further, defendants that are ordered to disgorge their ill-gotten 
profits will face higher costs because penalties are often not covered by in-
surance or tax deductible.205 
1.  New Restraints on the SEC’s Division of Enforcement 
The Kokesh decision comes at a time when the Securities and Ex-
change Commission is facing budget constraints under the current admin-
istration.206  In order to brace for the impact from potential budget cuts, the 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement has imposed a hiring freeze, a ban on non-
essential travel, and has reduced the use of outside contractors for their 
work.207  Even before Kokesh, the number of enforcement actions brought 
by the SEC was predicted to fall significantly.208  In addition to its budget 
and resource constraints, the post-Kokesh SEC will have less settlement 
leverage in multi-year enforcement actions now that defendants no longer 
face risk of disgorgement for conduct over five years old.209  This reduced 
leverage may potentially affect the enforceability of a number of cases, as it 
takes a considerable amount of time for the SEC to bring an enforcement 
action.210  As reported in the SEC’s Annual Performance Report for the fis-
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cal year 2015, the average time between an opening of an investigation and 
commencement of an enforcement action was twenty-four months.211 
With the current and looming budget cuts to the agency, the SEC may 
also be less motivated to investigate older securities law violations.212  If in-
vestigating an older potential violation, the Division of Enforcement will 
likely push tolling agreements on defendants in order to extend the limita-
tions period, but due to its reduced leverage in enforcement actions, it may 
be difficult for the Commission to obtain these agreements.213  Further, be-
cause disgorgement is considered a civil penalty, the amount of money the 
SEC can now take from a defendant is more restricted, for regulations limit 
the amount of money the agency can take from defendants through civil 
penalties.214  Under current regulations, the Commission is authorized to 
collect from a natural person up to approximately $1,000,000 in civil penal-
ties, depending on the severity of the violation.215 
The SEC serves the American public by protecting investors and en-
suring fair and transparent markets.216  The Commission’s Division of En-
forcement plays an especially important role in the agency’s mission by 
bringing hundreds of civil actions in courts every year,217 in which the SEC 
seeks to deter wrongdoing in the securities markets.218  Prior to Kokesh, 
disgorgement was the SEC’s most powerful remedy and brought in more 
than double the amount of damages as other remedies.219  However, the 
Kokesh decision deals a considerable blow to the SEC’s power to effective-
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ly enforce federal securities laws through disgorgement.220  For example, in 
Mr. Kokesh’s case, because the vast majority of the disgorgement was for 
misconduct over five years old, the disgorgement was reduced from about 
$30 million to $5 million.221  Consequently, this decision may significantly 
reduce the disgorgement orders for older misconduct, which may harm the 
SEC’s mission to deter certain securities law violations and, ultimately, pro-
tect investors.  Research has found that aggressive SEC enforcement deters 
future misconduct.222  Due to the Kokesh holding, however, the Commis-
sion will likely be less inclined to aggressively pursue disgorgement for 
long-term and well-hidden misconduct,223 such as Ponzi schemes224 and 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations.225  In sum, Kokesh may 
contribute to a considerable decline in the SEC’s enforcement capabilities. 
2.  Higher Costs for Misconduct Within Section 2462 
While the Kokesh decision likely restrains the SEC’s Division of En-
forcement in certain cases, there are also financial implications for defend-
ants in securities enforcement actions.  For instance, now that disgorgement 
is considered a penalty, insurers may not indemnify defendants that are or-
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dered to disgorge their ill-gotten gains within five years of their violation.226  
Courts have previously held that the indemnification of penalties is incom-
patible with public policy and prevented such coverage.227  And the pro-
spect is not theoretical.  In fact, insurance companies began using this ar-
gument to avoid indemnifying disgorged profits to those they insured only a 
few days after the Kokesh decision.228  Further, many insurance policies in-
clude provisions prohibiting the indemnification of civil penalties.229  This 
will especially impact individuals subject to large disgorgement orders, as 
opposed to businesses, for individuals are often unable to pay the dis-
gorgement without indemnification.230 
Along with insurance implications, disgorgement’s classification as a 
penalty may also affect the tax deductibility of the civil remedy.231  Under 
the Internal Revenue Code, one may deduct “all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade 
or business.”232  Payments made for court settlements and judgments are 
generally deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.233  Be-
fore Kokesh, the tax code allowed defendants to deduct the disgorgement 
amount from their taxes.234  However, the Internal Revenue Code does not 
allow deductions “for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for 
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the violation of any law.”235  These payments include those “[p]aid in set-
tlement of the taxpayer’s actual or potential liability for a fine or penal-
ty.”236  This has a considerable impact on a defendant’s costs, for if a set-
tlement or court order is tax deductible, up to half of the payment may be 
deducted from taxes.237  However, now that disgorgement is considered a 
penalty, the IRS will likely bar parties from deducting disgorgement pay-
ments from their taxes.238  In fact, prior to the Kokesh decision, the Office 
of the Chief Counsel for the IRS noted in a memorandum239 that a “payment 
imposed primarily for purposes of deterrence and punishment is not deduct-
ible,” including disgorgement payments to the SEC for FCPA violations.240  
Due to higher tax burdens241 and insurance insecurity,242 defendants facing 
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions for conduct less than five years 
old may be more likely to settle, and the now heightened costs of disgorge-
ment may also deter others from violating federal securities laws. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
disgorgement in securities enforcement operated as a penalty under the stat-
ute of limitations and must be brought within five years of the date when 
the claim accrued.243  The Court reached the right conclusion in this case 
because the SEC used disgorgement to penalize those who violate federal 
securities laws and to deter others from committing the same wrongful 
acts.244  Further, the Court correctly found that disgorgement in securities 
enforcement did not refund victims for their losses or return the defendant 
to the place they were before they violated the law.245  Despite coming to 
the correct conclusion, Kokesh places new constraints on the SEC’s ability 
to successfully enforce federal securities laws246 and imposes heightened 
costs on the remaining defendants who are ordered to disgorge their ill-
gotten gains, due to the remedy’s reclassification as a penalty.247 
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